The Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in Criminal Homicide Cases by Davis, John L.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 3 Article 3
1938
The Development of Negligence as a Basis for
Liability in Criminal Homicide Cases
John L. Davis
Stoll, Muir, Townsend and Park
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Davis, John L. (1938) "The Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in Criminal Homicide Cases," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 26 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol26/iss3/3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEGLIGENCE AS A BASIS FOR
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CASES
By JoHN L. DAvs*
The criminal law of today would seem to consist of the
rules applied by the social order to compel the individual to live
in contact with his fellows with the minimum of friction. But
at the outset of our discussion of the development of negligence
as a basis for criminal liability, we are faced with an origin at a
time in which social control was almost non-existant. The family
stood all powerful and there was no central force as we know it
today.' Further, the individuals seem to have been essentially
much simpler in their thought concepts. A child trips over a
stool and immediately kicks it. This is a very infantile reaction,
but is apparently the one which motivated our early Saxon and
Jutish ancestors in their conceptions of liability. So if X killed
Y, Y's relatives killed X. This is simple, but more complicated
situations present themselves. X accidentally killed Y. Still
the blood feud must be satisfied. Vengeance must be had. The
idea of revenge is the basis of all early liability whether in crime
or tort.2 Nor was this limited to personal relations. The desire
of retaliation is against the offending thing itself.
3
Since revenge was the ultimate motive back of the penalties
at the early law, it must be apparent that criminal liability
would not depend on the intent or the negligence of the person
doing the injury. The desire for revenge arose whenever the
injury was done. Liability was founded on the act doing damage
rather than on any subjective state of, or degree of care exer-
cised by, the defendant. Reverting to the paragraph above, the
stool did not intend to injure the boy, yet he kicked it. So when
one of our ancestors was injured, he sought vengeance against
the person or thing doing the injury because of the injury and
not because of any concept of mens rea or degree of societal harm.
* Attorney at law, Lexington, Ky.; associated with firm of Stoll,
Muir, Townsend and Park. A. B. 1935; LL. B. 1937, University of
Kentucky. Student editor, Kentucky Law Journal, 1936-7.
12 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 43.
'Holmes, The Common Law, 2.
'Holmes, op. cit. supra note 2, at 34; 2 Pollock and Maitland, His.
tory of English Law, 474.
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This idea was carried to an extent which seems almost
ludicrous to us today. If two men were working on a tree and
it fell and killed one of them, the tree was given to his kindred
for them to wreak vengeance on.4 "If a man leaves his arms
about and another knocks them over so that they kill or hurt a
man, the owner is liable; if a man lends another his horse and ill
befalls the borrower, the lender is liable; if a man asks another
to accompany him, and the other is attacked by his enemies
while accompanying him, the man who made the request is liable.
It is clear that such liability is founded not upon negligence but
upon the act doing damage.'' 5
Progress is impossible in a community which allows the blood
feud. Limitation is necessary. This presented one of the largest
problems of the early Saxon rulers. Perhaps not all of our
ancestors would enjoy the trials and tribulations attendant upon
the proper management of a feud, or perhaps there were some
sordid souls who would prefer cash on hand to the doubtful
pleasure of inserting a spear into the vitals of one who had
fallen out of a tree on his third cousin, killing him. At any rate
vengeance could be had and social standing maintained by the
acceptance of a sum certain, the price of his relative, his wer.
The problem of the early kings was to get all to accept this price
rather than to wage private war. "The wer was at first simply
an alternative to the feud. But when we first get evidence as to
the Anglo-Saxon law, this stage has passed. Pecuniary compen-
sation is, as a rule, obligatory.'" The rising power of the cen-
tral authority has been able to force on the relatives of the
deceased the bribe necessary to buy them off.
Most of the above discussion must be based largely on sup-
position. These ideas had received form before the advent of
written history of the peoples of whom we are speaking. At
any rate when we first begin to get any documentary records,
"the system is dominated by the ideas of the blood feud and the
bot and wer. When the main object of the law is to suppress
the blood feud by securing compensation to the injured person
or his kin, it is to the feelings of the injured person or his kin
that attention will be directed rather than to the conduct of the
4Holmes, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19.
5 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 52.
61d. at 45.
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wrongdoer.' " 7 It is the development of this idea that dominated
the field of criminal law up to the twelfth century.8 "Qui peccat
inscienter, scienter emendet." 9 A complicated system of tariffs
was worked out whereby the wer and wite' ° varied according to
the rank and station of the man injured or the amount of harm
inflicted.1 ' The defendant was required to swear that he had
done nothing whereby the person slain was "nearer to death or
further from life. "12 And if he was unable to so swear, he was
required to pay the relatives of the deceased the customary wer.
However where the person was purely passive, no liability was
imputed. 13 There was no act which brought the deceased nearer
to death.
It is true that in this period there is some hint of negligence
or intent as a basis for criminal liability. "It is moreover
decreed," run the laws of Alfred, "if any man have a spear over
his shoulder and any man stake himself upon it, that he shall
pay the wer without the wite. If he be accused of wilfulness in
the deed, let him clear himself according to the wite, and with
that let the wite abate."' 14 "And let this be, if the point be
three fingers higher than the hindmost part of the shaft, be that
without danger."' 15 We cannot read into this doom a require-
ment of an intent or negligence as a uniform basis for liability.
The defendant remained liable to the kin of the deceased for the
wer dispite any lack of intent or negligence. The only thing that
was remitted was the payment due to the central authority. This
is apparently the only thing which it had the power to give back,
and the king could make the remittitur dependant on any con-
dition that he saw fit.
The element of absolute liability for an act which causes
the death of another is well illustrated by the idea that if a thing
or animal is the cause of the death, that thing or animal must
be given up; and it is only when the owner declines to give it up
7Ia. at 50.
82 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 458; Sayre, Mens
Rea (1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 980.
'Leg. Henr. 88, 6; 90, 11.
"Payment due to the king for the killing.
2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 456 ff.
2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 52.
21 Ibid.
" Sayre, op. cit. note 8, at 982.
52 Holdsworth, op. cit. note 1, at 51, n. 8.
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that he can be made liable. 16 This was done so that the relatives
of the deceased might take vengeance on the offending thing
Very early the owner of the thing causing the injury was subject
to the blood feud. This blood feud came to be satisfied by the
payment of the customary wer, and later by the delivery of the
res itself.17 This idea was transferred to the later law and per-
sisted until as late as 1846. The thing was forfeited to the king
as deodand to be devoted by him to pious uses. 18 This forfeiture
depended not on any intent or negligence on the part of the
defendant but on the fact that the thing itself caused the injury.
Perhaps it will be well if we pause at this point for a brief
summary. The early basis for criminal liability was not negli-
gence or intent. The theory of liability was based on vengeance
and this was demanded whatever the state of mind of the party
doing the injury. While the blood feud was soon dispensed
with, this principle of absolute liability was carried on in the
system of the wer and wite. Perhaps one of the chief reasons
for this was the fact that the law made little difference between
crime and tort.' 9 The compensation was made to the injured
party regardless of the nature of the act causing the injury.
However somewhat of a relaxation of these principles of absolute
liability has been noted above. The public element of the man-
price, the wite, apparently in specific instances had been remitted
by royal order where the act was not intentional or negligent.
This is interesting as pointing the way to future development
which however did not come about until a much later time.
Considerable changes were accomplished in the criminal law
of the twelfth century.20 However these changes were largely in
procedure and had little effect on the bases for criminal liability.
Prosecution of criminals was largely at this time by way of
appeal of felony.21 If the appellee was found guilty he suf-
16Id. at 46; Holmes, op. cit. supra_ note 2, at 22-23.
I Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts (1894) 7 Hary. L.
Rev. 315, 328.
22 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 473. For an
application of this doctrine at a little later time see 24 Selden Soc.
72, 89.
'" 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 43.
20 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 458.
2 Appeal-a formal accusation made by one private person against
another of having committed some heinous crime. 1 Bouv. Law Dict.
208.
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fered the same punishment as if tried on an indictment. 22 Pun-
ishment was by the central authority. 23 The law of the wer has
perished since it is no longer applicable if there is a felony,
since punishment for felony is solely by the king.24 Side by side
with the procedure by appeal, there is growing up the procedure
by indictment which is to supplant the earlier mode.25 Perhaps
one of the greatest difference between the indictment and the
appeal lay in this, that a pardon could be granted in the former
and not in the latter.26 The reason is probably that the pro-
ceeding by appeal bears a close analogy to the proceeding to
recover the wer which could not be remitted by the king. It is
a private prosecution and not a public one.
However the law is but little removed from the state wherein
the wer and wite were the ordinary remedies for homicide.27 It
is too much to expect that the principles of liability should have
changed in any material way. In the field of criminal homicide,
certain types of killings had become to be absolutely justifiable.25
All others subjected the offender to criminal liability.29 Perhaps
a reason lay in the procedural difficulties. "The modern judge
with a convicted man-slayer before him has beneath his fingers
a whole gamut of punishment ranging from lifelong penal servi-
tude to a trifling fine. "30 "The only courses open to it (the
common law of this time) were (1) that of acquitting the man-
slayer of all guilt, (2) that of granting him a pardon, and (3)
that of sending him to the gallows, for it knew no other punish-
ment for homicide. "31 For negligence or intent to become a
separate basis for criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a
division of homicide into separate classifications, one classifica-
tion basing liability on intent and the other on negligence. How-
ever there need be no differentiation if all must be punished
alike. This was the case at the early common law. Bracton
4 Bl. Comm. 316.
2 Holdsworth, op. cit. note 1, at 256-7.
-'2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. note 3, at 483.
2 Holdsworth, op. cit. note 1, at 256-7.
4 B1. Comm. 316.
"3 Holdsworth, op. cit. note 1, at 311.
2 Killing in execution of a lawful sentence of the court or in the
arrest of an outlaw or a manifest thief. 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. note 1,
at 358.
202 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. note 3, at 470-2.
"Id. at 475.
8 Selden Soc. 235.
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attempted a division of the types of homicide, but his work on
this matter was practically a restatement of the work of a canon
lawyer, Bernard of Pavia, and was not representative of the law
of his day.8 2 Indeed the law of England was not yet ready to
receive the distinctions made by Bracton since it had no large
choice of punishments for criminal homicide.
Besides the procedural difficulties, the influence of the
Roman and canon law made against liability based on negligence.
The church laid considerable stress on the mental element in
sin.33 The Penitential Books taught that punishment should be
dependant on moral guilt, and the very essence of moral guilt is
a mental element.8 4 "Henceforth the criminal law of England,
developing in the general direction of moral blameworthiness,
begins to insist upon a mens rea as an essential of criminality. "35
Although the early common law never made the intent punish-
able without the act,36 it did feel that the essence of the more
serious crimes lay in the intent with which the act was done.37
The general rule came to be that no crime could be imputed to a
man without a mens rea.38  So with the increasing weight given
to the mental element in crime, it is not surprising that we have
found that negligence as a basis for criminal liability found little
place in the minds of the judges.
So far then, as the bases for criminal liability are concerned,
it is apparent that negligence could not, per se, be one. The
killing of a man was a felony regardless of the nature of the act
unless the act fell within one of the few narrow categories as
comprised the execution of a lawful sentence.39 Even in the
cases where the killing was done se defendendo or per infor-
tuniam, liability attached.40 However the offender could get a
pardon from the king.41  The procedure by way of pardon was
Sayre, op. cit. note 8, at 985.
32 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 476.
"Sayre, op. cit. supra note 8, at 988.
IIbid.
3Id. at 991-2; 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. note 3, at 476, n. 8.
"3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 373.
"Id. at 374.
* 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 472.4
0Id. at 470.
4Id. at 479; 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 312; Sayre,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 994; 1 Selden Soc. pl. 114, 188. See, however,
historical discussion in Reg. v. Mawgridge, Kelyng 120, 84 Eng. Rep.
1107 (1708) which says that he that killed an Englishman per infor-
tuniam was never in danger of death since the act was not a felony.
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regulated by the Statute of Gloucester. 42 The pardons at this
time were not of course but they became so at a later age.43 Still
later the jurors were allowed to return a verdict of not guilty
instead of a special verdict of misadventure or self-defense. 44
By the time the seventeenth century opened, murder was
a felony, but it depended on malice aforethought.45 Where the
homicide was committed in the exercise of an unlawful act, it
was also murder but the intent was implied or imputed from the
unlawful act.4 6 So where a man struck at one and killed another,
he was guilty of murder. "This malice is so odious in law as
though it be intended against one, it shall be extended against
the other. "' ' A division of homicide into murder and man-
slaughter had been accomplished. The latter was distinguished
from the former in that a killing in a sudden affray (chance-
medley) was manslaughter. 48 Homicide in self-defense was not
punishable, although we find a survival of the old absolute
liability discussed above in that the goods and chattels of the
defendant were forfeited although the act was done se defen-
dendo.49 Homicide by misadventure, "where a man does an act
that is not unlawful but which without any evil intent causes
the death of another," 50 was not felonious5 ' but it also entailed
a forfeiture.
5 2
After all, "crime in general always has depended and always
will depend upon deep-lying psychological concepts. ' 5 3 Consid-
erable development will as yet be necessary before any general
doctrine of the application of criminal punishments for a non-
compliance with an external standard will be evolved. It had
not arisen at this time.54 The concept of negligence as a general
Under this rule only the killing of a Norman was an offense against
the crown.
8- 6 Edw. I, c. 9 (1278); 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 313;
Coke, Third Inst. 56.
1 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 481.
11Id. at n. 3.
'1 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 449; Coke, Third Inst. 47.
'1 Hale, op. cit. at 465; Coke, op. cit. 56.
4, Coke, op. cit. at 51.
I Id. at 57.
11d. at 56.
" Ibid.
1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 45, at 39.
L2 See note Keilway 108, 72 Eng. Rep. 273 (1485-1547).
Sayre, op. cit. supra note 8, at 989.
3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 1, at 374.
K. L. J.-5
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basis for criminal liability was unborn; yet we may say that
such a concept was in its gestation period. There are isolated
instances of liability without intent. The ethico-psychological
concepts of the judges could not allow to go unpunished certain
acts which today would be characterized as negligent. They felt
in a dim way that liability should attach. It is to these cases
that we must now turn our attention.
However, it is believed that the judges who imposed liability
for acts which today we would characaterize as negligent did not
feel that they were establishing any new standard of liability.
The doctrine of the time, and we may say the universal doctrine,
was that there was no criminal responsibility without a mens rea.
"As to criminal proceedings, if the act that is committed be sim-
ply casual and per infortunium, regularly that act which were it
done exanimi intentione, were punishable with death, is not by
the laws of England to undergo that punishment for it is the
will and intention that regularly is required as well as the act
and event, to make the offense capital. ' '5 5 And again Hale says:
"The consent of the will is that, which renders human actions
either commendable or culpable; as where there is no law, there
is no transgression, so regularly, where there is no will to com-
mit an offense, there can be no transgression, or just reason for
the punishment of crimes or offenses.'1 56 If then anmens rea was
required, and criminal liability imposed'in the type of cases
which we are discussing, the only conclusion is that negligence
as we would call it was taken to be a type of mens rea.
With this in mind, let us take up a few cases. Hull's CaSe5 7
involved an indictment for murder. The defendant was a laborer
working on a building situated about thirty feet from a highway.
He was sent up to the top for a piece of timber. He called out,
"Stand clear", and threw over the timber which struck a work-
man and killed him. It was held that this was misadventure since
the defendant did nothing but what is usual with workmen to
do. The case also contains dictum to the effect that if the
defendant had done the act in London then the death would
have been manslaughter dispite the use of the warning. How-
ever Foster doubts that this statement is entirely correct.5s  If
"1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 45, at 38.
5I. at 14.5 Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1664).
58Foster, Crown Law (1762) 263.
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the act was done early in the morning when few people were
stirring, he believes that the death should be excused even though
the accident happened in London. In speaking of this case,
another author says, "For though the act itself might breed
danger, yet the degree of' caution requisite (is) only in propor-
tion to the apparent necessity for it. "59 In other words, what is
required is that a man act with reasonable prudence.
In another case reported by Hale, 0 A set his servant to
watch his corn at night to prevent deer from destroying it. He
ordered the servant to shoot anything rushing into the field, for
it would be deer. A then went into another part of the field and
rushed into the corn. The servant shot at the noise and killed
the master. The court held that it was homicide per infortunium.
The death was caused by the master's direction and by his own
act. However the court says that if it had been a stranger that
had been killed it might amount to manslaughter for want of
due diligence and better inspection. However, if the servant
were lacking in caution, it is difficult to see how the command of
the master could supply it.61
In S'ir John Chicester's Case62 the defendant was playing at
foils with his servant and the chafe of the defendant's scabbard
fell off unknown to him upon a thrust, so that the rapier went
into his man's belly and killed him. It was held to be man-
slaughter. However the reported facts do not present the true
picture. In fact the defendant was using a sword in a scabbard
and the servant only a bed-staff. The opinion of the court gives
no reason for the holding. Foster puts it on a lack of caution
which common prudence would have suggested.63 Hale however
says that the act of playing at foils was unlawful and that this
would explain the conviction. However it would seem that if
this had been the case the defendant should have been convicted
for murder.
The liability in these cases seems to be based on what we
know today as negligence, that is, the lack of the caution that
is usual with the ordinary man in that situation to take, or as we
define it, failure to take the care that a reasonably prudent man
11 East, Pleas of the Crown (1803) 262.
0 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 45, at 40.
11 East, op. cit. note 59, at 266.
2Aleyn 12, 82 Eng. Rep. 888 (1647).
$Foster, op. cit. supra note 58, at 260.
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would take under the same or similar circumstances. However
in the law at this time, there was another very similar type of
liability. Perhaps an example will serve to illustrate what we
mean. "A person driving a cart or other carriage happeneth to
kill. If he saw or had any timely notice of the mischief likely to
ensue and yet drove on, it will be murder for it was wilfully done
. . . If he might have seen the danger, but did not look before
him, it will be manslaughter for want of due circumspection.
But if the accident happened in such circumstances that no
want of due care will be imputed to the driver, it will be acci-
dental death and the driver will be excused. " 64 In this respect
another author says: "Neither shall he be adjudged guilty of a
less crime (than murder) who killed another in doing such a
wilful act as shews him to be as dangerous as a wild beast and an
enemy of mankind in general; as by going deliberately with a
horse used to strike, or discharging a gun among a multitude of
people.65 or throwing a great stone or piece of timber from a
house into a street through which he knows many are passing;
and it is no excuse that he intended no harm to anyone in par-
ticular or that he meant to do it only for sport or to frighten
people."66
It must be apparent to all that this is more than mere negli-
gence, although it is probably one of the roots from which lia-
bility for criminal negligence grew. In the first place there is a
difference in punishment. The one is guilty of murder, the other,
of manslaughter. As has been said above, negligence is the
failure to use the care which a reasonably prudent man would
use under the same or similar circumstances. In the type of
crime which we have just discussed, there is more than a failure
to use due care; there is an element of wilful wrongdoing. The
crime involves a reckless and wanton disregard for human life.
That reckless and wanton misconduct should not be considered
the same as negligence is indicated by the modern rule that in
the law of torts, contributory negligence is no defense to a claim
for injury caused by wilful or wanton misconduct.'
Old. at 263. See also 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 45, at 476; 1 East,
op. cit. supra note 59, at 263.
See also Rex v. Burton, 1 Stra. 481, 93 Eng. Rep. 648 (1722).
11 Hawkins, Pleas of thep Crown, 86 (8th ed. 1824), Sec. 12.
Snell v. Denncott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895 (1910); Zinc v. Foss,
221 Mass. 73, 108 N. E. 906 (1910). See also Fuller v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.,
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It will be well at this point to pause to lay down the defini-
tion of negligence as the term is used in this paper. Negligence
is the failure to use that care which the reasonably prudent man
would use under the same or similar eircumstances. This is the
proper use of the word negligence. As we have shown above,
negligence is not reckless and wanton misconduct. Nor are we
able to define more than one degree of negligence. While the
triple standard of care is used in many states, it is submitted
that it is illogical. The ordinary definition runs something like
this, "Gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care."
When called on to define slight care, the courts answer, "Slight
care is that care which a person fails to exercise when he is
guilty of gross negligence."
As has been said above, it is not believed that the judges of
this time thought that they were establishing any new basis for
criminal liability. On the contrary, they seem to have regarded
negligence as a type of nins rea. The fallacy in this, even at
this time, is well pointed out by two cases. The first is Rampton's
Case.0 s Here the defendant was indicted for manslaughter. He
found a pistol in the street and tried it with a rammer to see
whether or not it was loaded. Coming to the conclusion that it
wa not, the defendant pointed the pistol at his wife in sport,
and it went off, killing her. It was held that the defendant
was guilty of manslaughter. Foster thinks that this judgment
was erroneous. He believed that the defendant used a reasonable
precaution, what was usual and ordinary in like cases. This he
considers to be sufficient, "for the law in these cases doth not
require the utmost caution to be used." He then gives the second
of our two cases. A man took a gun to church but discharged it
before he got there. He left the gun at the door and a friend
borrowed it and loaded it. He then put it back without telling
the defendant. The defendant took up the gun after he brought
it home, pointed it in the direction of his wife, touched the trig-
ger, and the gun went off, killing her. The court was of the
opinion that the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing
that the gun was not loaded and directed the jury that if they
100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 783 (1911), where the court spoke of contributory
negligence as being no defense to an action involving reckless mis-
conduct.
6 Kelyng 42, 84 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1664).
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were of the same opinion, they should acquit him. He was
acquitted. 69
In both of these cases it is apparent that the mental state
was the same. In both the defendant believed that the gun was
not loaded, and was apparently attempting some uncouth pleas-
antry. While we may not agree with the finding of fact of the
court in the second case, it must be apparent that the difference
is in the degree of care used and not in any mental state which
would have subjected the defendant to an ecclesiastical punish-
ment in an earlier time. The whole ground for logical distinc-
tion is that in one case the defendant was living up to an external
standard of care while in the other he was not.
After the establishment of negligence as a basis for criminal
liability as represented by the cases above, little authority on the
question appears in the books, roughly during the eighteenth
century. That such cases must have arisen cannot be doubted,
but they are not found in the published reports. However after
1800 there is a good deal of law on the matter. We may safely
say that the prevailing English rule after this date is repre-
sented by the statement of Halsbury: "A person on whom the
law imposes any duty or who has taken upon himself any duty
tending to the preservation of life and who grossly neglects to
perform that duty or performs it with gross negligence and
thereby causes the death of another person is guilty of man-
slaughter. "70
It must be noted that under this rule liability is postulated
on gross negligence. This apparently represents the prevailing
English rule. In Regina v. Finney71 the court in summing up
to the jury told them that, "To render a person liable for neglect
of duty there must be such a degree of culpability as to amount
to gross negligence on his part." Regina v. Noakes7 2 indicates
that a greater degree of negligence is required to convict of
crime than for civil liability. This is still the modern rule. As
to reckless driving the court in Tinline v. White Gross Insurance
Association, Ltd.7 3 said, "The crime of manslaughter in a case
like this consists in driving a motor car with gross or reckless
Foster, op. cit. supra note 58, at 262-3.
709 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d. ed.) 445.
12 Cox, C. C. 625 (1874).
24 F. & F. 920, 176 Eng. Rep. 849 (1866).
[1921] 3 K. B. 327, 330.
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negligence. Ordinary negligence does not make a man liable for
manslaughter."
7 -
The foregoing discussion indicates that a major problem to
be faced is this: what is the development from the standard of
care, "what is usual and ordinary in such cases, '7 5 to the stand-
ard of gross negligence. The failure to use the care usual in a
given situation is not the same as gross negligence in all cases.
Failure to take slight care (gross negligence) differs from failure
to take ordinary care (ordinary negligence under the triple
standard) which is apparently the degree of care indicated by
Foster. Apparently the explanation is that at one point a court
considered that the early standard of care and gross negligence
were one and the same thing. Perhaps the court looked at the
cases based on reckless misconduct and failed to note that there
was a distinction between those and the ones applying the ordi-
nary standard of care. Probably the reason is that the court was
unable to free itself from the idea of a mens rea. At any rate
Halsbury 8 cites the statement of Foster with approval. Another
case approaches the early standard. In Bigmaidon's Case77 the
deceased was killed by a falling barrel. It was the contention
of the crown that the defendant was negligent in the mode in
which he slung the cask. Parke, J. told the jury that, "...
if you think that the mode which the prisoner used was reason-
ably sufficient, you cannot convict him." This case is cited by
Halsbury as supporting the statement of Foster. The instruc-
tion was given at a time when the court was applying the stand-
ard of gross negligence and it is apparent that the court did not
consider that it was making new law.
Ferguson's Case, 1 Lewin 182, 168 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1830) (gross
negligence); Reg. v. Salmon, 6 Q. B. D. 79 (1880) (wicked or culpable
negligence); Rex v. Timmins, 7 Car. & P. 498, 173 Eng. Rep. 221 (1836)
(gross negligence) and of. Rex v. Grout, 6 Car. & P. 629, 172 Eng. Rep.
1394 (1834) (negligence); Queen v. Spilling, 2 M. & Rob. 107, 174 Eng.
Rep. 230 (1838) (physician, gross want of skill or gross want of atten-
tion); Rex v. Williams, 3 Car. & P. 635, 172 Eng. Rep. 579 (1807)
(alleged negligence in medical treatment, Held: grossest Ignorance
or most criminal misconduct necessary to convict); Rex v. Long, 4
Car. & P. 398, 172 Eng. Rep. 756 (1830) (gross Ignorance or gross
inattention held necessary to constitute negligence in medical treat-
ment). For other cases on the liability of a physician see Rex v.
Long, 4 Car. & P. 423, 172 Eng. Rep. 767 (1831); contra, Rex. v. Simp-
son, 4 Car. & P. 408, 172 Eng. Rep. 760 (no date given).
75Foster, op. cit. supra, note 58, at 264.
' 9 Laws of England (2d ed.) 445.
771 Levin 180, 168 Eng. Rep. 1004 (1833).
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In spite of the requirement of the English court of gross
negligence, this rule has not been universally followed in the col-
onies. In the case of Rex v. Murphy7s the court expressly repu-
diates the statement of Halsbury give above.7 9 The court then
goes on to say that the question for the jury was: "Would a
reasonably careful milkman, reasonably sober, have done what
this man did?" The reason for the court repudiating the stand-
ard of Halsbury is interesting in the light of what we have
said above as to our inability to define more than one degree of
negligence. "Every judge has endeavored to find out a clear
crisp definition that will assist judges like myself in instructing
jurors, and every judge, had, I think, failed. And I think that
the most conspicuous failure of all is that given in the close of
the book from which Mr. Johnston (counsel for the prisoner)
has quoted-Lord Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 9, page
285. The principles are . . . in my experience entirely in-
capable of application.'"80
In the case of McCarthy v. The King8l the court held the
following instruction correct: "It is quite necessary and quite
proper that any person who drives a vehicle of that kind (a motor
car) must use care to see that he does not injure any person else,
and that if through want of care on his part-that is, reasonable
care, the care that an ordinary reasonably prudent man would
exercise-injury or death ensues to another person, then in law-
and I am so charging you-he is criminally responsible." There
was a statute in the cases 2 which read as follows: "Every one
who has in his charge or under his control anything whatever
whether animate or inanimate, or who effects, makes, or main-
tains anything whatever, which in the absence of precaution of
care, may endanger human life, is under a legal duty to take
reasonable care to avoid such danger and is criminally respon-
sible for the consequences of omitting without lawful excuse, to
perform such duty."
The court placed the decision squarely on the statute, but it
is interesting to note that Brodeur, J. did not feel that he was
without common law authority to support the decision. It is
S49 Ir. L. T. Rep. 15 (1914).
' 9 Halsbury's Laws of England (1st ed.) 582.
Rex v. Murphy, cited supra note 78, at 15, 16.
8159 D. L. R. 206 (1921).
8 Sec. 247 of the Canadian Criminal Code.
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also interesting to note the opinion of Sedgewick, J. in Union
Collery Co. v. The Qzteen S3 as to this section8 4 which is as fol-
lows: "This article I take to be a mere statutory statement of the
common law, neither abridging or enlarging it in any respect."
This holding is cited with approval by Duff, J. in the instant
case.85
These cases are interesting as pointing out the fact that there
has been a movement in the colonies away from the nineteenth
century English standard of care in criminal negligence cases.
The reason for the decision is indicated by Anglin, J. in the
Canadian case:86 "It would be most unfortunate if anything
should be said or done in this court to countenance the idea that
a motor car may be driven with immunity from criminal respon-
sibility if reasonable precautions are not taken against and rea-
sonable care be not used to avoid, danger to human life." It
would seem that, according to the rationale of the case, in our
complex state of society, where there are so many instrumentali-
ties which if not carefully used will cause death, the threat of
civil liability is not enough to act as a deterrent, and that the
sanctions of society must be imposed on those who do not use
reasonable care in order that the citizens of the state may be
reasonably free from bodily harm at the hands of its careless
individuals. However this case was later overruled by Rex v.
Grmisman8 7 wherein the court returned to the standard of gross
negligence of reckless misconduct.
Turning now to the American authorities we are struck at
the outset with the conflict indicated by the English and Colonial
cases discussed above between the mental element and the exter-
nal standard as applied to criminal negligence. The common law
came to accept gross negligence as a substitute for intent. Indeed
reckless and wanton misconduct, as gross negligence was defined,
is a species of intent. This tradition was carried over into our
jurisprudence.8 8 As was said by the court in State v. Cwster:ss
0 31 Can. Sup. Ct. 81 (1900).
1Then Sec. 213.
Rex. v. Murphy, cited supra note 80, at 208.
Id. at 209.
"[1926] 4 D. L. R. 738.
MCommonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134 (1809); Robertson v.
State, 2 Lea 239 (Tenn., 1879); Crystal v. Commonwealth, 72 Ky. 669
(1873); York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360 (1884).
a129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071, 67 A. L. R. 909, 916 (1929).
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"The first edition of Wharton on.Hiomicide was published Jan-
uary 1, 1855. Chapter VII relates to homicide by negligence.
The second division of the chapter relates to negligence of per-
sons riding or driving, which the author considers under two
heads, speed and caution. The English cases are reviewed, and
East's Pleas of the Crown was cited and quoted; but the chapter
contains nothing to indicate that the English common law relat-
ing to homicide by negligence had been displaced by an Ameri-
can common law governing the subject." 90 The requirement of
gross negligence is probably followed by the majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions today.91
It would seem that the refusal of many courts to base
criminal liability simply on mere negligence lies in their require-
ment of a mental element in crime, an intent to commit a crime
as distinguished from a mere error in judgment. As was said by
the court in State v. Young :92 "But our law is so humane that
no man will be adjudged to be a criminal who merely errs in
judgment in a matter about which there is room for some honest
difference of opinion." The court then goes on to require a
reckless disregard of the probable consequences so as to imply
a wilful wrong.93 This is merely an application of the universal
rule that reckless and wanton misconduct is sufficient for crimi-
nal liability. But if we are to allow criminal liability to be pos-
tulated on negligence at all, it is apparent that the intentional
"In Ohio there are no common law crimes. For conviction there
must be violation of a statute. Manslaughter is defined: "That If any
person shall unlawfully kill another without malice . . ., or uninten-
tionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act,
every such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter . . ." Under
this statute negligence, even gross negligence is held not to be such an
unlawful act. It is necessary to have an act prohibited by a state stat-
ute. Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607 (1902); State v.
O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N. E. 885 (1922); and Steele v. State, 121
Ohio St. 332, 168 N. E. 846 (1929). Note however that the same rule
did not apply in the Federal courts where there were no common law
crimes. U. S. v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L. Ed. 259 (1812).
In U. S. v. Meager, 37 Fed. 875 (1888) under a statute substantiaily like
the Ohio statute, manslaughter was held to include a negligent
killing. However the modern statute specifically includes negligence.
18 U. S. C. A., See. 453.
$Clark and Marshall on Crimes, Sec. 264a; Wharton on Homicide
(3rd ed., 1907) 681; People v. Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N. E. 575 (1919);
State v. Young, 56 Atl. 471 (N. J., 1903); State v. Campbell, 82 Conn.
671, 74 Ai. 927 (1910).
Supra, note 91.
See Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 8, 68 N. E. 238 (1903).
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element is lacking. Whether ordinary negligence or gross negli-
gence is required to convict, the fact that the defendant makes
an error in judgment will not relieve him of punishment. As
was said by Holmes, J. in Ocean Steamship Navigation Co. v.
Aitken, 4 "The standard of conduct whether left to the jury or
laid down by the court is an external standard and takes no
account of the personal equation of the man concerned."
Criminal liability based on negligence must seek its justifi-
cation in the establishment of an external standard.
"So far as civil liability is concerned, at least, it is very clear that
what we have called the external standard would be applied and that
if a man's conduct is such as would be reckless in a man of ordinary
prudence, it is reckless in him. Unless he can bring himself within
some broadly defined exception to the general rule, the law deliberately
leaves his idiosyncrasies out of account, and peremptorily assumes
that he had as much capacity to judge and to foresee the consequences
as a man of ordinary prudence would have in the same situation.
"If this be the rule adopted in regard to the redistribution of
losses which sound policy allows to rest where they fall, in the
absence of a clear reason to the contrary, there would seem to be
at least equal reason for adopting it in the criminal law which
has for its immediate object and task to establish a general standard
or at least general negative limits on conduct for the community, in
the interest of the safety of all."' *
Although the generally accepted standard, gross negligence,
was never seriously questioned by the majority of American
jurisdictions, nevertheless, certain states by statute or decision
adopted the principle embodied in the quotation of Mr. Justice
Holmes above. The test required by the Iowa court in an early
case,"" is only "such care as a reasonably prudent man should
and ought to use under like circumstances." A similar rule
was expressed in Belke v. People97 wherein the court said, "The
law casts upon him the legal duty of observing such care and
caution as is exercised by reasonable and prudent men under
like circumstances. "98 Also there is a line of cases in South
"196 U. S. 589 (1904).
0GHolmes, J. in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
"State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa 647 (1878).
"125 Ill. 584, 17 N. W. 744 (1888).
-See also Lee v. State, 41 Tenn. 62 (1860). Note however that
this type of instruction was later limited in Iowa to cases where the
use of a dangerous instrumentality was involved. See State v. Warner,
157 Iowa, 124, 137 N. W. 466 (1912). Where a non-dangerous instru-
mentality is involved the traditional rule as to the standard of care
is followed. State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1139, 196 N. W. 84 (1923), and
State v. Richardson, 240 N. W. 659 (Iowa, 1932). See also People v.
Marconi, 118 Cal. App. 683, 5 Pac. (2d) 974 (1931).
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Carolina which hold that only ordinary negligence is necessary
to convict. The first of these is State v. Gilliam"0 wherein the
court approved a charge to the jury in part as follows: "Then
the question is, was that death occasioned by the carelessness and
negligence of the party who was handling that weapon or imple-
ment as to inflict a wound that caused death? Negligence is the
want of ordinary care. Carelessness is also the want of ordinary
care." 0 0
In fissouri the matter is governed by the following statute:
"Every other killing of a human being by the act, procurement,
or culpable negligence of another which would be manslaughter
at the common law, and which is not excusable or justifiable, or
is not declared in this chapter to be manslaughter in some other
degree, shall be deemed manslaughter in the fourth degree."
Under this statute, culpable negligence was defined in State v.
Emery101 as, "The omission to do something which a reasonably
prudent, and honest man would do or doing something which
such a man would not do under all the circumstances of the
case. "1102
However this definition was expressly repudiated in State
v. Millin 03 where the court declared that the definition of culpa-
ble negligence as approved by the cases above was only the defini-
tion of the civil standard and said: 0 4 "Before a person may be
convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence under our
statute, not only must death have ensued from a negigent act or
omission of such person, but there must be facts and circum-
stances in evidence tending to prove that such person was
actuated at the time by a reckless disregard of the consequences
of his act, from which the jury may reasonably infer the crimi-
nal intent so essential to guilt in every lawful conviction for
- 66 S. C. 419, 45 S. E. 6 (1903).
- This holding was approved in State v. Revels, 86 S. C. 213,
68 S. E. 523 (1910); State v. McCalla, 85 S. E. 720 (S. C., 1915); and
State v. Quick, 167 S. E. 191 (S. C., 1932). Cf. however State v. Davis,
128 S. C. 265, 122 S. E. 770 (1924), where the court held that in every
circumstance, mere negligence will not constitute manslaughter.
20178 Mo. 77 (1883).
2This definition was followed in State v. Horner, 266 Mo. 109,
180 S. W. 873 (1915); State v. Coulter, 204 S. W. 5 (Mo., 1918); con-
versely in State v. Weisman, 256 S. W. 740 (Mo., 1923); and also in
State v. Pauly, 267 S. W. 799 (Mo., 1924).
1 318 Mo. 553, 300 S. W. 694 (1927).
.04 State v. Millin, 318 Mo. 553, -, 300 S. W. 694, 697 (1927).
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violation of our criminal statutes." In State v. Melton 05 appar-
ently the court is in accord with the Millin case since it held that
the evidence showed that the defendant was so negligent as to
indicate a reckless disregard of human life and safety. How-
ever the court cited the Homer, Watson and Emery eases as
authority for the conviction which they are not.
In State v. Nevils'06 apparently both types of definition are
found combined in one instruction and the jury were told to
convict if they found that the defendant without exercising the
care of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances did
recklessly and carelessly fire the fatal shot. The instruction
was approved on the theory that the use of the terms "carelessly
and recklessly" told the jury that more was required to convict
than mere civil negligence. In the recent case of State v. Am-
brltster'0 7 the court again expressly approved the definition of
culpable negligence found in the Emery case. However in State
v. Studebaker'08 the court apparently attempted to strike a
middle ground. Culpable negligence under this case is still such
negligence as is defined by the tort standard but the court
refused to convict unless a reasonable man should know that life
was endangered by the act.
In construing a statute substantially like that found in Alis-
souri,10 9 the Wisconsin court held that mere want of ordinary
care was sufficient to constitute the offense and relied heavily on
the earlier Missouri cases. 110  In Texas the definition of ordi-
nary negligence is made a part of the statute."'
There is a line of cases in Kentucky which distinguish be-
tween voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in so far as
21326 Mo. 962, 33 S. W. (2d) 894 (1930).
110330 Mo. 831, 51 S. W. (2d) 47 (1932).
2-63 S. W. (2d) 144 (Mo., 1933).
3-66 S. W. (2d) 877 (Mo., 1933).
' Wis. Stat., Sec. 4363: "Every other killing of a human being
by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, where such
killing is not justifiable or excusable, or is not declared in this chapter
murder or manslaughter of some other degree, shall be deemed man-
slaughter in the fourth degree."
n0 Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N. W. 209 (1921). This
holding was approved in Njecick v. State, 178 Wis. 94, 189 N. W. 147
(1922). See also Kleist v. Cohodas, 195 Wis. 637, 219 N. W. 366 (1929),
where the court indicated that it still considered that the rule of the
Clemens case was the law of that jurisdiction.
21 See Haynes v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. 42, 224 S. W. 1100 (1920), and
Young v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. 39, 47 S. W. (2d) 320 (1932).
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the degree of care necessary to convict is concerned. Reeldess or
wanton misconduct or gross carelessness is necessary to convict
for voluntary manslaughter. On the other hand, ordinary negli-
gence only is necessary to convict for involuntary manslaughter.
As was said by the court in Embry v. Commonwealth,"1 2 "In
these cases and others it was pointed out that if the act of con-
duct of the accused was wanton or reckless or grossly careless,
he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. On the other hand if
he was guilty of only ordinary negligence or carelessness the
offense was involuntary manslaughter." Apparently the way in
which the Kentucky court gets around the requirement of gross
negligence as a necessary postulate for criminal liability is that
a want of ordinary care in the use of a dangerous instrumentality
is per se gross negligence. 1 3  This would seem to be clearly
error because the commonly accepted definition of gross negli-
gence is failure to exercise slight care and not failure to exercise
ordinary care. However the following language in the Held case
must be noted: 14 "In that case the court approved an instruc-
tion on voluntary manslaughter based upon the recklessly care-
less use of a loaded pistol in a room where others were present,
and affirmed a conviction thereunder carrying with it confine-
ment in the penitentiary, from which it is clear that if a reck-
lessly careless use of a loaded pistol amounts to voluntary man-
slaughter, a want of ordinary care in its use in the presence of
others liable to kill and which does kill, would necessarily be
involuntary manslaughter. '" 1 5
However these cases seem to have made but little impression
on the prevailing rule outside these jurisdictions. Most states
seem to hold that more than negligence as defined by the tort
standard is required. 1" 6 In Kansas the court held that a statute
very similar to the Missouri and Wisconsin statutes mentioned
above was merely declaratory of the common law and that there-
-236 Ky. 204, 32 S. W. (2d) 979 (1930).
n3 Held v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 209, 208 S. W. 772 (1919).
21 Id. at 775.
w See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 652, 131 S. W. 517
(1910). There is a complete collection of the Kentucky cases in
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 97, 91 S. W. (2d) 998, 1000 (1936).
26People v. Angelo, 219 App. Div. 646, 221 N. Y. Supp, 47 (1927);
State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567 (1910); People v. Adams, 289
Ill. 339, 124 N. E. 575 (1919); Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252, 115 N. E.
943 (1919); and State v. Oakley, 176 N. C. 755, 97 S. E 616 (1918).
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fore a difference had to be made between ordinary and gross
negligence, only the latter being sufficient to convict for a crime.
The court in effect repudiated the early Missouri rule.117
As has been said above the refusal of some courts to base
criminal liability on simple negligence lies in a concept of
criminality which is based on a mental element, a guilty mind.
118
From our historical discussion we are led to the conclusion that
such a concept is quite in accord with the common law principles
of liability. Due to the influence of the church, the idea of a
mens rea has come to permeate our criminal law. The decisions
applying the tort standard are much in the minority, and in at
least two jurisdictions"1 9 there has been a recent shift from the
tort standard to the gross negligence standard.
Thus it will be seen that the great majority of the cases
require that the defendant have been guilty of something in the
nature of reckless disregard or at least gross negligence before a
conviction may be had for manslaughter. This does not seem
to be the view which logic requires. As has been pointed out
the majority rule is dictated by the remains of the idea of mens
rea. In fact when liability is postulated on negligence, gross or
ordinary, what the law does is to set up an external standard.
Criminal law is approaching a breach from the concept of a
mental element in criminality. This is indicated by the devel-
opment of statutory crimes which do not depend on intent and
by the development of negligence as a basis for criminal liability.
It would seem better to apply a standard which is capable of as
exact definition as the nature of the subject matter permits. The
more difficult cases, those where there is little culpability, can be
taken care of by light sentences.'
2 0
However, it is thought that the application of the tort rule
would not be accepted by the people with which the court has
to deal. The idea of the odium of crime still attaches, that it is
something morally wrong. Until the idea arises that the state
"' State v. Custer, 129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071 (1929).
31a State v. Young, supra note 91.
Canada and Missouri.
120 Note the following English cases as to the sentence imposed: Rex
v. Grout, 6 Car. & P. 629, 172 Eng. Rep. 1384 (1884) (one month);
Reg. v. Weston, 14 Cox, C. C. 346 (1879) (six months); Reg. v. Jones,
12 Cox, C. C. 628 (1874) (six months); Rigmaidon's Case, 1 Lewin 180,
168 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1830) (six months); Rex v. Sullivan, 7 Car. & P.
639, 173 Eng. Rep. 280 (1836) (one shilling fine).
230 KENTucKY LAw JOuRNAI3
has the right to punish for all injuries to it, whether they are
black or white in the moral sense, the tort standard in criminal
negligence cases will not be generally accepted. Perhaps the
most advisable rule at this time would be to apply the tort
standard to the use of dangerous instrumentalities, and the tra-
ditional rule to other negligent homicides. It is thought that
this would be supported by public opinion and that it is a step
in the right direction.
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